Minimal Synchrony for Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus by Bouzid, Zohir et al.
Minimal Synchrony for Asynchronous Byzantine
Consensus
Zohir Bouzid, Achour Mostefaoui, Michel Raynal
To cite this version:
Zohir Bouzid, Achour Mostefaoui, Michel Raynal. Minimal Synchrony for Asynchronous Byzan-
tine Consensus. AP. 2015. <hal-01103466>
HAL Id: hal-01103466
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01103466
Submitted on 14 Jan 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Publications Internes de l’IRISA
ISSN : 2102-6327
PI 2025 – January 2015
Minimal Synchrony for Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus
Zohir Bouzid* Achour Mostéfaoui** Michel Raynal*** ****
Abstract: Solving the consensus problem requires in one way or another that the underlying system satisfies some
synchrony assumption. Considering an asynchronous message-passing system of n processes where (a) up to t < n/3
may commit Byzantine failures, and (b) each pair of processes is connected by two uni-directional channels (with possibly
different timing properties), this paper investigates the synchrony assumption required to solve consensus, and presents
a signature-free consensus algorithm whose synchrony requirement is the existence of a process that is an eventual
〈t+1〉bisource. Such a process p is a correct process that eventually has (a) timely input channels from t correct processes
and (b) timely output channels to t correct processes (these input and output channels can connect p to different subsets
of processes). As this synchrony condition was shown to be necessary and sufficient in the stronger asynchronous system
model (a) enriched with message authentication, and (b) where the channels are bidirectional and have the same timing
properties in both directions, it follows that it is also necessary and sufficient in the weaker system model considered
in the paper. In addition to the fact that it closes a long-lasting problem related to Byzantine agreement, a noteworthy
feature of the proposed algorithm lies in its design simplicity, which is a first-class property.
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1 Introduction
Byzantine consensus A process has a Byzantine behavior when it behaves arbitrarily [25]. This bad functioning can be
intentional (malicious behavior, e.g., due to intrusion) or simply the result of a transient fault that altered the local state
of a process, thereby modifying its execution in an unpredictable way.
We are interested here in the consensus problem in message-passing distributed systems prone to Byzantine process
failures whatever their origin. Consensus is an agreement problem in which each process first proposes a value and then
decides on a value [25]. In a Byzantine failure context, the consensus problem is defined by the following properties:
every non-faulty process decides (termination), no two non-faulty processes decide differently (agreement), and the
decided value is not arbitrary, i.e., it is related in one way or another to values proposed by non-faulty processes (validity).
Context of the paper A synchronous distributed system is characterized by the fact that both processes and commu-
nication channels are synchronous (or timely) [3, 20, 27]. This means that there are known bounds on process speed
and message transfer delays. Let t denote the maximum number of processes that can be faulty in a system made up of
n processes. In a synchronous system, consensus can be solved (a) for any value of t (i.e., t < n) in the crash failure
model, (b) for t < n/2 in the general omission failure model, and (c) for t < n/3 in the Byzantine failure model [19, 25].
Moreover, these bounds are tight.
Differently, when all channels are asynchronous (i.e., when there is no bound on message transfer delays), it is
impossible to solve consensus even if we consider the weakest failure model (namely, the process crash failure model)
and assume that at most one process may be faulty (i.e., t = 1) [14]. It trivially follows that Byzantine consensus is
impossible to solve in a failure-prone asynchronous distributed system.
As Byzantine consensus can be solved in a synchronous system and cannot in an asynchronous system, a natural
question that comes to mind is the following “When considering the synchrony-to-asynchrony axis, which is the weakest
synchrony assumption that allows Byzantine consensus to be solved in a message-passing system?” This long-lasting
question is the issue addressed in this paper. To that end, the paper considers a synchrony assumption capturing the
structure and the number of eventually synchronous channels among correct processes.
Related work Several approaches to solve Byzantine consensus have been proposed. We consider here only determin-
istic approaches1 . One consists in enriching the asynchronous system (hence the system is no longer fully asynchronous)
with a failure detector, namely, a device that provides processes with (possibly unreliable) hints on failures [9]. Basi-
cally, in one way or another, a failure detector encapsulates synchrony assumptions. Failure detectors suited to Byzantine
behavior have been proposed and used to solved Byzantine consensus (e.g., [12, 15, 18]).
Another approach proposed to solve Byzantine consensus consists in directly assuming that some channels satisfy
a synchrony property (“directly” means that the synchrony property is not hidden inside a higher level abstraction such
as a failure detector). This approach, which relies on the notion of an 3〈x + 1〉bisource (read “3” as “eventual”), was
introduced in [1]. Intuitively, this notion states that there is a correct process that has x input channels from correct
processes and x output channels to correct processes that are eventually timely [11, 13] (the “+1” comes from the fact
that it is assumed that each process has a “virtual” input/output channel from itself to itself, which is always timely).
Considering asynchronous systems with Byzantine processes without message authentication, it is shown in [1]
that Byzantine consensus can be solved if the system has an 3〈n − t〉bisource (all other channels being possibly fully
asynchronous). Moreover, the process that is the 3〈n − t〉bisource can never be explicitly known by the whole set of
processes. Considering systems with message authentication, a Byzantine consensus algorithm is presented in [24] that
requires an 3〈t + 1〉bisource only. As for Byzantine consensus in synchronous systems, all these algorithms assume
t < n/3. Finally, it has been shown in [4] that the “3〈t+1〉bisource” synchrony assumption is a necessary and sufficient
condition to solve Byzantine consensus in asynchronous bi-directionnal message-passing systems, enriched with message
authentication.
1Enriching the system with random numbers allows for the design of randomized Byzantine consensus algorithms. These algorithms are
characterized by a probabilistic termination property (e.g., [5, 8, 21, 26]).
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Content of the paper This paper presents a Byzantine consensus algorithm for signature-free asynchronous message-
passing systems, which requires only the two assumptions: t < n/3 and the existence of an 3〈t+ 1〉bisource. As these
assumptions are necessary and sufficient to solve Byzantine consensus in the asynchronous model enriched with message
authentication [4], it follows that (a) the existence of an 3〈t+ 1〉bisource is necessary and sufficient to solve Byzantine
consensus in an asynchronous signature-free system, and (b) the proposed algorithm is optimal with respect to underlying
synchrony assumptions.
The proposed algorithm is round-based. To attain its goal, it relies on a modular construction involving two commu-
nication abstractions and two distributed objects. More precisely, we have the following.
• The communication abstractions are the one-to-all reliable broadcast (RB) abstraction introduced in [6], and a very
simple new communication abstraction that we call cooperative broadcast (CB). As suggested by its name, it is an
all-to-all broadcast abstraction. This abstraction, which uses RB as an underlying subroutine, is particularly simple.
It actually captures important cooperation properties, which make easier the design of upper layer distributed
agreements.
• The two distributed objects are the following ones (the implementation of each of them use the underlying CB
broadcast abstraction).
– The first object is a message-passing version of the adopt-commit (AC) object (introduced in [16]) appropri-
ately modified to cope with up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes. Each round of the consensus algorithm uses
a specific AC object. The aim of these objects is to prevent the consensus safety property from being violated.
– The second object is a round-based object called eventual agreement (EA) object. It aims is to ensure the
consensus termination property. Hence, its implementation relies on the 3〈t+ 1〉bisource assumption.
It is important to emphasize that, when designing the algorithm presented in the paper, modularity and simplicity were
considered as first class design criteria. The algorithm presented is only the last step of a long quest: “Simplicity does
not precede complexity, but follows it” (Alan Perlis, First Turing Award).
Road map The paper is made up of 7 sections. Section 2 presents the basic underlying asynchronous Byzantine
computation model, the RB broadcast abstraction and the new CB broadcast abstraction. Section 3 presents an AC
object suited to message-passing systems prone to Byzantine failures. Then, Section 4 presents the 3〈t + 1〉bisource
behavioral assumption. Section 5 presents the round-based eventual agreement object. Section 6 pieces together the
previous abstractions to obtain the synchrony-optimal Byzantine consensus algorithm. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 Basic Model, Reliable Broadcast, and Cooperative Broadcast
2.1 Processes, communication network, and failure model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 sequential processes, namely Π =
{p1, . . . , pn}. As local processing times are negligible with respect to message transfer delays, they are considered
as being equal to zero. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y are used to say that pi belongs to the set Y .
Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable
point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means
that the network does not loss, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that any pair of processes
is connected by two uni-directional channels (one in each direction). Hence, when a process receives a message, it can
identify its sender. Moreover, as there is no message loss, all message transfer delays are finite.
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A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where TAG is the type
of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself.
A process receives pi a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. Then then say that the message is received by pi.
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves
arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform
arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending
messages with the same content, while they should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty).
A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty. Given an execu-
tion, C denotes the set of processes that are correct in this execution.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate another
process. Moreover, it is assumed that the Byzantine processes do not control the network (they can neither corrupt the
messages sent by non-faulty processes, nor modify the message reception schedule).
Discarding messages from Byzantine processes If, according to its algorithm, a process pj is assumed to send a single
message TAG() to a process pi, then pi processes only the first message TAG(v) it receives from pj . This means that,
if pj is Byzantine and sends several messages TAG(v), TAG(v
′) where v′ 6= v, etc., all of them except the first one are
discarded.
Unreliable (best effort) broadcast This simple broadcast is defined by a pair of operations denoted broadcast() and
receive(), where broadcast TAG(m) is used as a shortcut for
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for.
This means that a message broadcast by a correct process is received at least by all the correct processes. Differently,
while it is assumed to send the same message to all the processes, a faulty process can actually send different messages
to distinct processes and no message to others.
Notation The notation BZ_ASn,t[∅] is used to denote the previous basic Byzantine asynchronous message-passing
computation model.
2.2 Reliable broadcast abstraction
This broadcast abstraction (in short, RB-broadcast) was proposed by G. Bracha [6]. It is a one-shot one-to-all commu-
nication abstraction, which provides processes with two operations denoted RB_broadcast() and RB_deliver(). When
pi invokes RB_broadcast() (resp., RB_deliver()), we say that it “RB-broadcasts” a message (resp., ”RB-delivers” a
message). An RB-broadcast instance where process px is the sender is defined by the following properties.
• RB-Validity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m (from px), then, if px is correct, it RB-broadcast m.
• RB-Unicity. A correct process RB-delivers at most one message from px.
• RB-Termination-1. If px is non-faulty and RB-broadcasts a message m, all the non-faulty processes eventually
RB-deliver m from px.
• RB-Termination-2. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m from px (possibly faulty) then all the non-
faulty processes eventually RB-deliver the same message m from px.
The RB-Validity property relates the output to the input, while RB-Unicity states that there is no message duplication.
The termination properties state the cases where processes have to RB-deliver messages. The second of them is what
makes the broadcast reliable. It is shown in [7] that t < n/3 is an upper bound on t when one has to implement such
an abstraction. For self-containment of the paper, an algorithm implementing RB-broadcast is described in Appendix B
(this algorithm is from [6]).
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Notation The basic computing model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted BZ_ASn,t[t <
n/3]. RB-broadcast can consequently be implemented in this model.
2.3 Cooperative broadcast abstraction
Definition This new communication abstraction (in short CB-broadcast) is a one-shot all-to-all broadcast defined by
an operation, denoted CB_broadcast(), plus a read-only per process pi, denoted cb_validi. “All-to-all” means that it is
assumed that all correct processes invoke CB_broadcast(). When a process pi invokes CB_broadcast(v), we say that “it
cb-broadcasts v”.
An invocation of CB_broadcast() by a process pi has an input parameter, namely the value that pi wants to broadcast,
and returns a value, which is a value CB-broadcast by a correct process. The CB-broadcast abstraction is formally defined
by the following properties.
• CB-Operation Termination. The invocation of CB_broadcast() by a correct process terminates.
• CB-Operation Validity. If the invocation of CB_broadcast() returns v to a correct process pi, v ∈ cb_validi.
• CB-Set Termination. The set cb_validi of a correct process pi is eventually non-empty.
• CB-Set Validity. The set cb_validi of any correct process pi contains only values cb-broadcast by correct processes.
• CB-Set Agreement. The set cb_validi and cb_validj of any two correct processes pi and pj are eventually equal.
Feasibility condition in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes Letm be the number of different values that can
be cb-broadcast by correct processes. It follows from the previous specification that, even when the (at most) t Byzantine
processes propose a same value w, not proposed by a correct process, w can neither be returned, nor belong to the set
cb_validi of a correct process pi. This can be ensured if and only if there is a value cb-broadcast by at least (t+1) correct
processes. This feasibility condition is captured by the predicate n − t > mt. (A proof of this feasibility condition can
be found in [17]).
Hence, we assume in the following that at most m ≤ bn−(t+1)
t
c different values can be cb-broadcast by the set of
correct processes, and the corresponding abstraction is called anm-valued CB-broadcast.
An algorithm implementing CB-broadcast A simple algorithm implementing CB-broadcast is described in Figure 1.
When pi invokes CB_broadcast(vi), it first invokes RB_broadcast CB_VAL(vi) for all correct processes to be eventually
aware of vi (line 1). Then, it waits until its set cb_validi becomes non-empty (line 2). When this occurs, pi takes any
value from cb_validi and returns it (line 3). Finally, pi adds to cb_validi all the values it RB-delivers from (t + 1)
different processes (i.e., v was RB-broadcast by at least one correct process). It is important to notice that, after the
predicate cb_validi 6= ∅ became satisfied, new values can still be added to cb_validi.
operation CB_broadcast(vi) is
(1) RB_broadcast CB_VAL(vi);
(2) wait (cb_validi 6= ∅);
(3) return (any value in cb_validi).
when CB_VAL(v) is RB_delivered from pj do
(4) if (v RB_delivered from (t+ 1) diff. processes) then add v to cb_validi end if.
Figure 1: An algorithm implementing m-valued CB-broadcast in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3]
Theorem 1. The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements them-valued CB-broadcast abstraction in BZ_ASn,t[t <
n/3].
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
6 Z. Bouzid & A. Mostéfaoui & M. Raynal
Proof Proof of the CB-Termination properties.
It follows from the feasibility condition, that there is a value v that is proposed by at least (t + 1) correct processes.
Hence, these processes RB-broadcast CB_VAL(v). It then follows from line 4 and the RB-termination property that v
will be added to the set cb_validi of each correct process pi. Hence, the CB-Set Termination property is satisfied, and no
correct process can be blocked forever at line 2, from which follows the CB-Operation Termination property.
Proof of the CB-Validity properties.
To prove the CB-Set Validity property, let us consider a value v cb-broadcast only by Byzantine processes. It follows that
a correct process pi can RB-deliver v from at most t different processes. Hence, pi cannot add v to cb_validi at line 4,
which proves the property. The CB-Operation Validity property is then a trivial consequence of the CB-Set Validity
property.
Proof of the CB-Set Agreement property.
Let us consider a value v ∈ cb_validi. This means that pi RB-delivered the message CB_VAL(v) from (t + 1) different
processes (line 4). It then follows from the RB-termination property of RB-broadcast that each correct process pj RB-
delivers these (t+1) messages CB_VAL(v). Consequently, any correct process pj adds v to its local set cb_validj , which
concludes the proof. 2Theorem 1
3 Adopt-Commit in the Presence of Byzantine Processes
This object was introduced in [16] in the context of read/write communication. Here we slightly modify its definition to
cope with Byzantine processes (which by definition can decide anything).
Definition An adopt-commit (AC) is a one-shot object which encapsulates the safety part of agreement problems. It
provides processes with a single operation denoted AC_propose(). This operation takes a value as input parameter (we
say that the invoking process proposes this value), and returns a pair 〈d, v〉 (we say that the invoking process decides
〈d, v〉), where d is a control tag and v a value. An AC object is defined by the following properties.
• AC-Termination. An invocation of AC_propose() by a correct process terminates.
• AC-Validity. This property is made up of two parts.
– AC-Output domain. If a correct process decides 〈d, v〉, d ∈ {commit, adopt}, and v is a value that was
proposed by a correct process.
– AC-Obligation. If all the correct processes propose the same value v, only the pair 〈commit, v〉, can be
decided.
• AC-Quasi-agreement. If a correct process decides 〈commit, v〉, no other correct process can decide 〈−, v′〉 where
v′ 6= v.
Implementations of an AC object in the presence of process crash failures can be found in [16, 22]. The imple-
mentation of [16] is for asynchronous systems where any number of processes may crash and communication is by
atomic read/write registers. The implementation of [22] is for asynchronous message-passing systems where a minority
of processes may crash.
It follows from the AC-Output domain property, that a value proposed only by Byzantine processes cannot be decided
by a correct process. This means that an AC object has the same feasibility condition as CB-broadcast (let us also notice
that this is independent from the fact that an AC object can be built on top of CB-broadcast). Hence, we assume that at
mostm ≤ bn−(t+1)
t
c values can be proposed by the correct processes, and the corresponding object is called anm-valued
adopt-commit object.
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Implementation of an m-valued adopt-commit object A distributed algorithm implementing an AC object in the
presence of up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes is described in Figure 2, for a correct process pi. This algorithm is based
on an underlying CB-broadcast, which means that each process has a read-only local set cb_vali (initially empty).
operation AC_propose(vi) is
(1) esti ← CB_broadcast AC_PROP(vi);
(2) RB_broadcast AC_EST(esti);
(3) wait (AC_EST(est)messages have been RB-delivered from (n− t)
different processes, and their est values belong to cb_validi);
(4) mfv i ← most frequent value in the previous (n− t) AC_EST()messages;
(5) if (each of the previous (n− t) AC_EST()messages carriesmfv i)
(6) then return (〈commit,mfv i〉)
(7) else return (〈adopt,mfv i〉)
(8) end if.
Figure 2: An algorithm implementing anm-valued adopt-commit object in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3]
When a process pi invokes AC_propose(vi), it first issues CB_broadcast AC_PROP(vi) from which it obtains a value
that it saves in esti (line 1). It then RB-broadcasts the message AC_EST(esti) (line 2), and waits until (a) it has RB-
delivered messages AC_EST() from (n − t) different processes, and (b) the values carried by these messages belong to
the set cb_validi supplied by CB-broadcast (line 3). Let us remember that, after the predicate cb_validi 6= ∅ became
satisfied, new values can still be added to cb_validi.
When this predicate becomes satisfied, pi computes the most frequent value mfv i carried by the previous (n − t)
AC_EST() messages (line 4). If there are several “most frequent” values, pi takes any of them. Finally, if all the messages
who made satisfied the predicate of line 3 carried the same value mfv i, pi returns the pair 〈commit,mfv i〉) (line 6);
otherwise it returns the pair 〈adopt,mfv i〉) (line 7).
Theorem 2. Assuming that all the correct processes invoke AC_propose(), the algorithm described in Figure 2 imple-
ments an m-valued adopt-commit object in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3].
Proof Proof of the AC-termination property.
Due to the CB-Operation termination property, no correct process blocks forever at line 1. So, we have only toshow
that no correct process can block forever at line 3. It follows from CB-Set Termination and CB-Set Validity that the sets
cb_validi of the correct processes are eventually not empty and contain only values proposed by correct processes. As
(i) the value RB-broadcast by each correct process at line 2 is a value of its set cb_validi, (ii) there are at least (n − t)
correct processes, and (iii) the sets cb_validi of the correct processes are eventually equal (CB-Set Agreement property),
it follows that the predicate of line 3 is eventually satisfied at each correct process, which concludes the proof of AC-
termination property.
Proof of the AC-Output domain property.
Let us first observe that a correct process can decide only 〈commit, v〉 or 〈adopt, v〉 (lines 6-7). Hence, we have only
to show that v is a value proposed by a correct process. A value v decided by a correct process pi was RB-delivered in
a message AC_EST(v). It follows from the predicate of line 3 that v ∈ cb_validi. Finally, if follows from the CB-Set
Validity property that v is a value proposed by a correct process.
Proof of the AC-Obligation property.
If all correct processes propose the same value v, it follows from the CB-Set (Termination, Validity, and Agreement)
properties that the set cb_validi of each correct process pi is eventually equal to {v}. Hence, each correct process RB-
broadcasts the message AC_EST(v) at line 2. It then follows from the predicate of line 3 that no value different from v
can be decided.
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Proof of the AC-Quasi-agreement property.
Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that pi decides 〈commit, v〉 while pj decides 〈−, v
′〉. As pi decides
〈commit, v〉, it follows from line 3 that it RB-delivered the message AC_EST(v) from (n− t) different processes. As, due
to the RB-Unicity and RB-Termination-2 properties, no two correct processes RB-deliver different values from the same
process, it follows that, among the (n − t) messages AC_EST() RB-delivered by pj , at most t of them may carry a value
different from v, i.e., at least n− 2t ≥ t+ 1 carry the value v. It follows that v is the most frequent value RB-delivered
by pj , and consequently v
′ = v. 2Theorem 2
4 The 3〈t+ 1〉Bisource Assumption
4.1 Definitions
These notions were introduced in [1, 13] (see also Appendix A).
Eventually timely channel Let us consider the channel connecting a process pi to a process pj . This channel is
eventually timely if there is a finite time τ and a bound δ, such that any message sent by pi to pj at time τ
′ is received by
pj by timemax(τ, τ
′) + δ. Let us observe that neither τ , nor δ, is known by the processes.
As already indicated, there is an input/output channel from each process to itself.
3[k]sink, 3[k]source, and 3[k]bisource A correct process pi is an 3[k]sink if it has eventually timely input channels
from k correct processes (including itself). This set of processes is denoted X−i . Similarly, a correct process is an
3[k]source if it has k eventually timely output channels to correct processes (including itself). This set of processes is
denoted X+i .
An 3[k]bisource is a correct process pi that is both 3[k]sink and 3[k]source. Let us remark that the timely input
channels and the timely output channels do not necessarily connect pi to the same subset of processes.
Notation for system models The system model BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3] enriched with an 3〈t + 1〉bisource is denoted
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1〉bisource].
5 Eventual Agreement Object
5.1 Motivation and definition
This object, which is round-based, will be used to ensure the termination of the consensus algorithm, namely, its aim is to
allow the correct processes to eventually converge on a single value. To this end, it provides the processes with a single
operation denoted EA_propose(r, v) where r is a round number and v is the value proposed at this round by the invoking
process. Each invocation of EA_propose() by a correct process returns a value. It is assumed that each correct process
invokes this operation once per round, and its successive invocations are done according to consecutive round numbers.
When a process invokes EA_propose(r, v), we say that it “ea-proposes v at round r”.
Definition An eventual agreement (EA) object is defined by the following properties.
• EA-Termination. For any r, if all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r,−), each of these invocations terminates.
• EA-Validity. For any r, if all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r, v) no correct process returns a value different
from v.
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• EA-Eventual agreement. If the correct processes execute an infinite number of rounds, there is an infinite number
of rounds r at which all the correct processes return the same value v, where v is such that a correct process invoked
EA_propose(r, v).
It is important to notice that the EA-Validity property is particularly weak. More precisely, if, during a round r, two
correct processes invoke ea_propose(r, v1) and EA_propose(r, v2), with v1 6= v2, the invocation of EA_propose(r,−)
by any correct process is allowed to return an arbitrary value (i.e., even a value proposed neither by a correct nor by a
Byzantine process).
As the implementation that follows uses at every round an instance of CB-broadcast, we assume that at most m ≤
bn−(t+1)
t
c different values are ea-proposed by correct processes.
5.2 Implementation of anm-valued eventual agreement object
Definitions The algorithm presented below uses the following sets and functions.
• There are α =
(
n
n−t
)
possible combinations of (n− t) processes among the n processes p1, ..., pn. Let us call them
F1 . . . Fα.
• Given any round number r ≥ 1:
– coord(r) denotes the function
(
(r − 1) mod n
)
+ 1.
Given a round r, coord(r) defines its coordinator process. As we can see, if there is an infinite number of
rounds, each process is infinitely often round coordinator.
– F (r) denotes the function Findex(r), where index(r) =
(
(d r
n
e − 1) mod α
)
+ 1.
Hence, each set F (r) returns a set made up of (n− t) processes. During each round, its coordinator strives to
decide a value. To this end, it requires the help of the processes in F (r) to broadcast the value it champions.
F1 is used by the coordinators of the rounds 1 to n; F2 is used by the coordinators of the rounds (n + 1) to
2n; ..., Fα is used by the coordinators of the rounds ((α − 1)n + 1) to αn; F1 is used by the coordinators of
the rounds ((αn + 1) to (α+ 1)n; etc.
Considering an infinite sequence of rounds, it is important to notice that there is an infinite number of rounds r and r′
such that (coord(r) = coord(r′)) ∧ F (r) = F (r′) and an infinite number of rounds r and r′ such that
(
coord(r) =
coord(r′)
)
∧
(
F (r) 6= F (r′)
)
.
Local variables Each process pi manages the following local variables.
• timeri[1..] is an array of timers, such that timeri[r] is the timer used by pi for round r.
• CB [1..] is an array of CB-broadcast instances shared by all processes. CB [r] is the instance associated with round
r. Hence, CB [r].cb_validi is the set of values supplied to pi by CB [r].
To distinguish messages which have the same tag but are sent at different rounds, a message XXX() associated with
round r is denoted XXX[r]().
Algorithm: first part of EA_propose() (Lines 1-5) The algorithm executed by a correct process pi is described in
Figure 3. Let us remind that, it is assumed that each correct process invokes EA_propose() at every round.
When a correct process pi invokes EA_propose(ri, vali) (ri is a round number and vali the value it ea-proposes at
this round), it first invokes CB [ri].CB_broadcast EA_PROP1(vali), and saves the value returned in auxi (line 1).Then, pi
broadcasts the message EA_PROP2[ri ](auxi) (line 1) and waits until (a) it has received messages EA_PROP2[ri ]() from
(n − t) different processes, and (b) the values carried by these messages belong to the set CB [ri].cb_validi supplied by
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operation EA_propose(ri, vali) is
(1) auxi ← CB [ri].CB_broadcast EA_PROP1(vali);
(2) broadcast EA_PROP2[ri](auxi);
(3) wait (EA_PROP2[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t)
different processes, and their aux values belong to CB [ri].cb_validi);
(4) if (the (n− t) previous messages carry the same value v) then return(v) end if;
(5) set timeri[ri] to ri;
(6) wait (EA_RELAY[ri](aux) messages received from (n− t) different processes);
(7) if
(
EA_RELAY[ri](v) where v 6= ⊥ received from a process in F (ri)
)
(8) then return(v)
(9) else return(vali)
(10) end if.
when EA_PROP2[r]() is received from a process in F (r) do
(11) if
(
(i = coord(r) ∧ (EA_COORD[r]() not already broadcast)
)
(12) then let w be the value carried by the message EA_PROP2[r]();
(13) broadcast EA_COORD[r](w)
(14) end if.
when EA_COORD[r](v) is received from pcoord(r) or (timeri[r] expires) do
(15) if (EA_RELAY[r]() not already broadcast)
(16) disable timeri[r];
(17) if (timeri[r] expired) then v_coordi ← ⊥ else v_coordi ← v end if;
(18) broadcast EA_RELAY[r](v_coordi)
(19) end if.
Figure 3: An algorithm implementing anm-valued EA object in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t+ 1〉bisource]
CB-broadcast instance CB [ri] (line 3). If all these messages carry the same value v, pi returns v as result of its invocation
EA_propose(ri, vali) (line 4)
2. Otherwise, pi sets the timer associated with the round ri to the value ri (line 5)
3.
Algorithm: message processing and role of the round coordinator (Lines 11-19) Each round r uses a round coor-
dinator, defined by coord(r). As we have also seen, the set of (n − t) processes denoted F (r) is associated with round
r.
When pi is the coordinator of round r and receives for the first time a message EA_PROP2[r]() from a process in
the set F (r), it champions the value w carried by this message to become the value returned by the invocations of
EA_propose(r,−). To that end, it simply broadcasts the message EA_COORD[r](w) (lines 11-14).
When a process pi receives a message EA_COORD[r](v) from the coordinator of round r, if not yet done, it broadcasts
the message EA_RELAY[r](v) to inform the other processes that it has received the value v championed by the coordinator
of round r. If the local timer associated with this round (timeri[r]) has already expired, pi broadcasts the message
EA_RELAY[r](⊥), to inform the other processes that it suspects the coordinator of round r not to be an 3〈t+1〉bisource
(this suspicion can be due to the asynchrony of the channel connecting pcoord(r) to pi, or the fact that –while pcoord(r) is an
3〈t+1〉bisource– the link from pcoord(r) to pi is not yet synchronous, or the fact that pcoord(r) has a Byzantine behavior).
In all cases, as timeri[r] will no longer be useful, pi disables it. This behavior of pi is captured by the lines 15-19.
2Let us remark that lines 1-3 of Figure 3 and lines 1-3 of Figure 2 differ only in the fact that an RB-broadcast is used at line 2 for the AC
object, and a simple broadcast is used at line 2 for the EA object. These lines have not been encapsulated to define a higher level object because
the messages EA_PROP2[ri]() are explicitly used in lines 11-14 of Figure 3, while their counterparts in an AC object –messages AC_EST()– are not
used by the upper layer.
3The important point here is that the value of the timer increases; as ri increases at every round, it is used as a timeout value. More generally, it
is possible to assign to timeri[ri] the value returned by an increasing function fi(ri), which can be specific to each process pi.
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Algorithm: second part of EA_propose() (Lines 6-10) After it has set timeri[ri] (line 5), pi waits until it has re-
ceived a message EA_RELAY[ri ]() from (n − t) different processes (line 6). When this occurs, the invocation of
EA_propose(ri, vali) by pi returns a value. This value is v 6= ⊥ if pi received a message EA_RELAY[ri ](v) from a
process in the set F (ri) (lines 7-8). Otherwise, no process of F (ri) witnesses the value championed by the coordinator
of round r. In this case, pi returns the value vali, i.e., the value it ea-proposed (line-9).
5.3 Proof
Let us remember that, by assumption, all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r,−), where r = 1. Moreover, they
ea-propose at most m different values.
Lemma 1. For any r, if all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r, v) no correct process returns a value different from
v.
Proof Since all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r, v), all of them invoke CB [r].CB_broadcast EA_PROP1(v) at
line 1. It follows from the CB-Set Validity property that the set CB [r].cb_validi of any correct process pi can contain
only the value v. Therefore, the (n − t) messages EA_PROP[r]() considered at line 3 carry necessarily the value v.
Consequently, every correct process that executes line 4 necessarily returns v. That is, no other value can be returned by
a correct process. 2Lemma 1
Lemma 2. Let r ≥ 1. If all correct processes invoke EA_propose(r,−), then each of these invocation terminates.
Proof Let pi a correct process. Let us first observe that, due to the CB-Operation Termination property, pi cannot be
blocked forever when it invokes CB [r].CB_broadcast EA_PROP1() at line 1. Hence, the proof consists in showing that
pi cannot block forever at line 3 or line 6.
The proof that pi cannot block forever at line 3 follows from the following observation. As a correct process cannot
block forever at line 1, each correct process pj broadcasts the message EA_PROP2[r](auxj ) at line 2 where auxj was
returned by its invocation of CB [r].CB_broadcastEA_PROP1() at line 1. It follows from the CB-Operation Validity
property that auxj ∈ CB [r].cb_validj . Moreover, according to the CB-Set Agreement property, auxj is eventually
added to the set CB [r].cb_validi of every correct process pi. Consequently, each correct process pi receives messages
EA_PROP2[r]() from at least (n − t) processes and the values carried by these messages eventually belong to its set
CB [r].cb_validi. Consequently no correct process remains blocked forever at line 3.
It remains to prove that pi cannot block forever at line 6. Let us observe that since timeri[r] is set to r, it follows that
this timer expires at every correct process. Hence, the when condition preceding line 15 becomes true at every correct
process and each of them broadcasts an EA_RELAY[r]() message if not already done. It follows that pi receives messages
EA_RELAY[r]() from at least (n− t) processes. Therefore, pi cannot be blocked forever waiting at line 6. 2Lemma 2
Lemma 3. If the correct processes execute an infinite number of rounds, there is an infinite number of rounds r at which
all the correct processes return the same value v, where v is such that a correct process invoked EA_propose(r, v).
Proof Let us define the following rounds:
• Let r1 be the first round that is strictly greater than 2δ.
• Let p` be an 3[t+ 1]bisource. There exists a round r2 such that in every subsequent round:
- Each message sent by any px ∈ X
−
` to p` is received within an interval of at most δ time units.
- Each message sent by p` to any py ∈ X
+
` is received within an interval of at most δ time units.
• Let r > max(r1, r2) be any round coordinated by p` such that X
+
` ⊆ F (r) and F (r) ⊆ C. Let us notice that, due
to the definition of F (r), an infinity of such rounds r exists.
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Claim C. For every process pi ∈ X
+
` , we have v_coordi 6= ⊥ in round r (line 18).
Proof of claim C. Let pi be any process in X
+
` . Let τ be the time at which pi sets the timer at line 5 of round r. At this
moment, since pi finished executing line 4, there are at least (n− t) processes from which pi received an EA_PROP2[r]()
message. Since |X−` | ≥ t+ 1, it follows that among these (n− t) processes, there is at least one, say pk, that belongs to
X−` . Observe that pk necessarily broadcast the message EA_PROP2[r]() before τ . Since r > r2, this message is received
by p` before time τ + δ.
Therefore, if p` did not broadcast a message EA_COORD[r]() before receiving EA_PROP2[r]() from pk, as pk ∈
X−` ⊆ F (r), the condition of line 11 and the when statement preceding it are both satisfied, and p` broadcasts EA_COORD[r]()
at line 13. Consequently, in all cases, p` broadcasts a message EA_COORD[r]() by time τ + δ. Finally, since pi ∈ X
+
`
and r > r2, this message is received by pi before time τ + 2δ.
Let us recall that, as r > r1, it holds that r > 2δ, and consequently, since pi set timeri[r] to r (line 8) at time τ ,
the timeout occurs after time τ + 2δ. Therefore, pi receives the message EA_COORD[r]() from p` before the timeout.
Consequently, when evaluated by pi, the predicate of line 17 is necessarily false, and v_coordi 6= ⊥. This proves the
claim.
We show in the following that all correct processes return the same value in round r. Let us first observe that every
correct process broadcasts an EA_PROP2[r]() message that carries a value which was necessarily ea-proposed by a correct
process. Therefore, since p` is correct (and is the coordinator of r), the message EA_COORD[r]() it broadcasts in round r
contains a value, say w, that was sent to it by a correct process. Therefore, since (due to the definition of r), the processes
of F (r) are correct, the EA_RELAY[r]() messages broadcast by them carry either w or ⊥. Consequently, every correct
process pi can either returns w or vali after executing the lines 7-10. To finish the proof, it remains to show that no
correct process pi returns vali (if vali 6= w).
Let us observe that each correct process waits at line 6 until it receives (n − t) EA_RELAY[r]() messages. Since
|X+` | > t, it follows that at least one of these messages was broadcast by a process inX
+
` . Due to Claim C, this message
cannot carry ⊥. It then follows from the predicate of line 7 that any correct process executes line 8 and returns w, which
proves the lemma. 2Lemma 3
Theorem 3. The algorithm described in Figure 3 implements anm-valued eventual agreement object in BZ_ASn,t[t <
n/3,3〈t + 1〉bisource].
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3. 2Theorem 3
5.4 Looking for efficiency: Parameterized eventual agreement
Time complexity of the EA algorithm The aim of the previous algorithm was to attain a round r during which all
correct processes return the same value (ea-proposed by one of them). Hence its time complexity can be measured by
the value of this round number. As the underlying synchrony assumption is eventual, we only know that this number r is
finite.
Hence, to eliminate the noise created by the “eventual” attribute, and consequently be able to compute a time com-
plexity of the algorithm, let us replace the 3〈t + 1〉bisource synchrony assumption by the 〈t + 1〉bisource assumption,
i.e., we consider that there is a 〈t + 1〉bisource from the very beginning. The corresponding system model is denoted
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t + 1〉bisource].
The uncertainty created by the “eventual” attribute is consequently eliminated, and the only uncertainty is the identity
of the bisource and its associated input and output timely channels. As there are n processes and α =
(
n
n−t
)
combinations
for the sets F (r), it follows that the algorithm, which works in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1〉bisource], terminates in at
most αn rounds when the system behaves as BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t + 1〉bisource].
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Improving the time complexity One way to improve the time complexity of the algorithm (as measured previously)
is to consider a “tuning” parameter k, 0 ≤ k ≤ t, and use it in both the synchrony assumption and the size of the sets
F (r), as follows.
• The assumption 〈t+ 1〉bisource is replaced by the stronger assumption 〈t+ 1 + k〉bisource.
• Instead of (n − t), the size of the sets F (r) is now n− t+ k.
An algorithm, parameterized with k, extending the basic algorithm of Figure 3 and based on the previous definition
is described in Appendix C. Designed for the system model BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1 + k〉bisource], this algorithm
has a time complexity of βn where β =
(
n
n−t+k
)
when executed in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t+ 1 + k〉bisource].
As simple instances of this parameterized algorithm, let us consider two particular values of k. For k = 0, we
obtain the basic algorithm. For k = t, the time complexity is n, which is the best that can be obtained with a round
coordinator-based algorithm (up to n rounds can be needed to benefit from the 〈t+ 1 + k〉bisource).
6 Byzantine Consensus Algorithm
m-Valued Byzantine consensus In them-valued Byzantine consensus, the correct processes propose values from a set
of at most m values. The corresponding object is a one-shot object, that provides the processes with a single operation
denoted CONS_propose(v), where v is the value proposed by the invoking process. This operation returns a value to the
invoking process. If pi obtains the value v, we say that it “decides” v. The consensus object is defined by the following
properties.
• CONS-Termination. The invocation of CONS_propose() by a correct process terminates.
• CONS-Validity. If a correct process decides a value v, there is a correct process that invoked CONS_propose(v).
• CONS-Agreement. No two correct processes decide different values.
An algorithm solvingm-valued Byzantine consensus Assumingm ≤ bn−(t+1)
t
c, the algorithm described in Figure 4
implements an m-valued consensus object in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t + 1〉bisource]. This algorithm, which –thanks to
the previous abstractions– is simple, uses the following underlying objects.
• Each process pi manages a round number ri (initialized to 0), and a current estimate of the decision value, denoted
esti.
• EA_OBJECT is anm-valued eventual-agreement object shared by all processes. Its aim is to allow the processes
to eventually converge to the same estimate value. Hence, the associated line 4 is mainly related to the CONS-
Termination property.
• AC_OBJECT [1..] is an unbounded array ofm-valued adopt-commit objects, shared by all processes. AC_OBJECT [r]
is the adopt-commit object used at round r. The aim of these objects (line 6) is to allow the correct processes to
decide a value proposed by one of them, and to prevent them from deciding different values, i.e., to guarantee
consensus safety.
• CB [0] is a CB-broadcast instance, used at the very beginning to obtain a value proposed by a correct process and
allow a process pi to use the associated set CB [0].cb_validi to check the validity of the values returned by the
EA_OBJECT object (i.e., to check if this value was proposed by a correct process).
When a correct process pi invokes CONS_propose(vi), it first invokes CB [0].CB_broadcastVALID(vi) to obtain a
value for was proposed by a correct process (line 1)4. As already indicated, this invocation also ensures that the sets
CB [0].cb_validi of correct processes are eventually equal and contain values proposed only by correct processes.
4Even if, up to now, a process behaved “correctly”, it may crash in the future and become then faulty. Hence, no process can a priori considers
the value it proposes as a value proposed by a correct process.
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operation CONS_propose(vi) is
(1) esti ← CB [0].CB_broadcast VALID(vi); % safety: validity %
(2) repeat forever
(3) ri ← ri + 1;
(4) v ← EA_OBJECT .EA_propose(ri, esti); % liveness %
(5) if (v ∈ CB[0].cb_validi) then esti ← v end if; % safety: validity %
(6) 〈tag, esti〉 ← AC_OBJECT [ri].AC_propose(esti); % safety: agreement %
(7) if (tag = commit) then RB_broadcast DECIDE(esti) end if
(8) end repeat.
when DECIDE(v) is RB-delivered do
(9) if (DECIDE(v) RB-delivered from (t+ 1) diff. processes) then return(v) end if.
Figure 4: An algorithm for m-valued Byzantine consensus in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t+ 1〉bisource]
Then process pi enters an infinite loop (lines 2-8). After it has entered its current round (line 3), process pi proposes its
current estimate of the decision value esti to the to the EA object, namely, it invokes EA_OBJECT .ea_propose(ri, esti)
(line 4). If the value returned by this invocation is a value that it knows as proposed by a correct process, it adopts it as
new estimate, otherwise it keeps its previous estimate (line 5).
Process pi proposes then the current value of esti to the adopt-commit object associated with the current round, from
which it obtains a pair 〈tag, esti〉 (line 6). If the value of the tag is commit (line 7), pi RB-broadcasts the message
DECIDE(esti) to inform the other processes that the value of esti can be decided. Then, whatever the value of the tag, pi
proceeds to the next round with its (possibly new) estimate value esti.
Finally, as soon as a process, that not yet decided, has RB-delivered the same message DECIDE(v) from (t + 1)
different processes, it decides v and stops (line 9). Let us notice that at least one of these messages is from a correct
process.
Theorem 4. The algorithm described in Figure 4 solves them-valued Byzantine consensus problem in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1〉bisource].
Proof We say that a process pi starts round r when it assigns value r to its local variable ri (line 3).
Proof of the CONS-Termination property.
If a process decides at line 9, it previously RB-delivered the message DECIDE(v) from (t+1) different processes. Due to
the RB-termination property of the corresponding (t+ 1) RB-broadcasts, each correct process RB-delivers this message
from the same set of (t + 1) processes, and consequently decides. So, let us assume by contradiction that no correct
process decides at line 9.
Let us first observe that, due to the CB-Operation Termination property that no correct process pi blocks forever at
line 1. Moreover, it follows from the CB-Operation Validity that CB [0].cb_validi 6= ∅ when this invocation terminates.
As no correct process decides, and all correct processes invoke EA_propose(1,−), it follows from the EA-Termination
and AC-Termination properties that they all terminate the first round, and consequently start the second. Moreover, if
the estimate esti of a correct process pi is updated at line 5, its new value is a value proposed by a correct process. It
follows that the correct processes start the second round with estimate values esti containing values proposed by correct
processes. As no correct process decides, the same reasoning applies to all rounds r > 1.
Let us observe that the local variables CB [0].cb_validi of the correct processes eventually converge to the same
content (CB-Set Agreement and Termination properties of CB [0]). Hence, there is a round r0 such that, for every correct
process pi, the set CB [0].cb_validi is never updated after it starts r0.
It then follows from the EA-Eventual Agreement property of EA_OBJECT , that there is a round r > r0 during
which all correct processes obtain the same value v at line 4, where v is a value proposed by a correct process. Hence,
since r > r0, they all succeed the test of line 5 and adopt v as their new estimate esti. Therefore, all correct processes
invokeAC_OBJECT [r].AC_propose(v) at line 6. Due to the AC-Obligation property of AC_OBJECT [r], all correct
processes obtain 〈commit, v〉 at line 6. Consequently, they all RB-broadcast the same message 〈commit, v〉 at line 7. An
Collection des Publications Internes de l’Irisa c©IRISA
From Byzantine binary Byzantine to multivalued consensus 15
n − t ≥ t + 1, the decision predicate of line 9 becomes eventually true at every correct process, which contradicts the
initial assumption.
Proof of the CONS-Validity property.
Let us consider the first round. Let pi be a correct process. It follows from the CB-Operation Validity property of
CB [0] that esti is a value proposed by a correct process. Moreover, it follows from the CB-Set Validity property, that
CB [0].cb_validi contains only values proposed by correct processes. It follows from these observations that, be or not
esti modified at line 5, it contains a value proposed by a correct process when pi invokes AC_OBJECT [1].AC_propose(esti)
at line 6. It then follows from the AC-Validity property of AC_OBJECT [1] that the value assigned to esti at line 6 is
a value proposed by a correct process. The same reasoning applies iteratively to all rounds, from which it follows that a
value that is RB-broadcast by a correct process at line 7 is a value proposed by a correct process.
If a correct process pi decides a value v at line 9, it follows from the decision predicate used at this line that v was
RB-broadcast at line 7 by at least one correct process pj . The previous paragraph has shown that such a value v was
proposed by a correct process.
Proof of the CONS-Agreement property.
Let us first observe that, if a correct process decides at line 9, it decides a value RB-broadcast by a correct process at
line 7. Hence, the proof consists in showing that no two correct processes RB-broadcast different values at line 7.
Let r be the first round at which a correct process pi RB-broadcast a message DECIDE() at line 7. Let v the value
carried by this message. It follows that, at line 6, pi obtained the pair 〈commit, v〉 from the object AC_OBJECT [r].
Let us consider another correct process pj . There are two cases.
• pj RB-broadcast the message DECIDE(w) at line 9 of round r. This means that it obtained 〈commit, w〉 from
AC_OBJECT [r]. It then follows from the AC-agreement property of the object AC_OBJECT [r] that v = w.
Moreover, pj proceeds to the next round with estj = v.
• pj did not RB-broadcast the message DECIDE(w) at line 9 of round r. It then follows from the AC-agreement
property of AC_OBJECT [r] that pj obtained the pair 〈adopt, v〉. Hence, at line 6, pj assigned the value v to
estj .
It follows that the estimate values of all the correct processes that progress to the next round are equal to v. Let
px be any correct process executing round (r + 1). It follows from the EA-Validity property of EA_OBJECT , that
the invocation by px of EA_OBJECT .EA_propose(r + 1, estx) returns v, and from the AC-Obligation property of
AC_OBJECT [r + 1] that this object returns 〈−, v〉 to px. This means that the estimates of all the correct processes
remain forever equal to v. Hence, no value different from v can be RB-broadcast at line 7 by a correct process during a
round r′ ≥ r. 2Theorem 4
7 Conclusion
A variant To ensure that a value decided by a correct process is always a value that was proposed by a correct process,
this paper has considered m-valued consensus, i.e., there is a value that is proposed by at least m correct processes.
To ensure that no value proposed only by Byzantine processes is ever decided, some Byzantine consensus algorithms
(e.g., [10, 23]) do not have such an “m-valued” requirement. They instead allow the correct processes to decide a default
value ⊥ when they do not propose the same value. The algorithms proposed in the paper can be modified to satisfy this
different validity requirement.
The aim and the content of the paper This paper presented a consensus algorithm for asynchronous Byzantine
message-passing systems, that is optimal with respect to the underlying synchrony assumption. This assumption is
the existence of a process that is an eventual 〈t+1〉bisource. Such a process p is a non-faulty process that eventually has
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(a) timely input channels from t correct processes and (b) timely output channels to t correct processes. Moreover these
input and output channels can connect p to different subsets of processes.
In addition to a reliable broadcast abstraction, the design of the algorithm, which is very modular, is based on simple
abstractions: a new broadcast abstraction called cooperative broadcast, adopt-commit objects that cope with Byzantine
processes (hence, as far as we know, the paper presented the first implementation of such objects in the presence of
Byzantine processes), and a new round-based object called eventual agreement, whose definition involves a pretty weak
validity property.
This paper answered a long-lasting problem, namely, solving Byzantine consensus with the weakest underlying
synchrony assumptions. Finally, as claimed in the introduction, and in addition to its optimality with respect to synchrony
requirements, a very important first class property of the proposed algorithm lies in its design simplicity. “Simplicity ⇒
easy” is rarely true for non-trivial problems [2].
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A On the Definition of 3〈t+ 1〉bisource
Our definition of an 3〈t + 1〉bisource is slightly different from the original definition introduced in [1]. The difference
is that it considers only eventually timely channels connecting correct processes, while [1] considers eventually timely
channels connecting a correct process to correct or faulty processes. Hence, an3〈t+1〉bisource is an3〈2t+1〉bisource
in the parlance of [1]. We consider only eventually timely channels connecting pair of correct processes for the following
reason: an eventually timely channel connecting a correct process and a Byzantine process can always appear to the
correct process as being an asynchronous channel.
B An algorithm implementing RB-broadcast
The distributed algorithm described in Figure 5 implements the RB-broadcast abstraction. It is a simplified version of an
algorithm due to G. Bracha [6]. Its proof can be found in [6].
When a process pi wants to RB-broadcast a message whose content is vi, it broadcasts the message INIT(i, vi) (line 1).
When a process pi receives a message INIT(j,−) for the first time, it broadcasts a message ECHO(j, v) where v is the
data content of the INIT() message (line 2). If the message INIT(j, v) received is not the first message INIT(j,−), pj is
Byzantine and the message is discarded. Finally, when pi has received the same message ECHO(j, v) from more than
(n + t)/2 processes, it broadcasts the message READY(i, vi) (line 4). The fact that ECHO(j, v) was received from more
than (n + t)/2 processes ensures that no two correct processes can broadcast different messages READY(j,−), but it is
still possible that correct processes broadcast such a message while other correct processes never broadcast a message
READY(i,−).
The aim of lines 6-8) is to prevent deadlock. Finally, the aim of lines 9-11 is to ensure that all or none of the non-faulty
processes RB-deliver the message MSG(j, v) from pj . To this end, the RB-delivery predicate requires that pi receives
(2t+ 1) copies of READY(j, v), which means at least (t+ 1) copies from non-faulty processes (line 9).
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operation RB_broadcast MSG(vi) is
(1) broadcast INIT(i, vi).
when INIT(j, v) is received do
(2) if
(
first reception of INIT(j,−)
)
then broadcast ECHO(j, v) end if.
when ECHO(j, v) is received do
(3) if
(
ECHO(j, v) received from more than n+t
2
different processes and READY(j, v) not yet broadcast
)
(4) then broadcast READY(j, v)
(5) end if.
when READY(j, v) is received do
(6) if
(
READY(j, v) received from (t+ 1) different processes and READY(j, v) not yet broadcast
)
(7) then broadcast READY(j, v)
(8) end if;
(9) if
(
READY(j, v) received from (2t+ 1) different processes and MSG(j, v) not yet RB-delivered
)
(10) then RB_deliver (j,MSG(v)) % RB-delivery of the message MSG(v) from pj %
(11) end if.
Figure 5: Implementing RB-broadcast in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3] (from [6])
C Parameterized Eventual Agreement Object
Let k such that 0 ≤ k ≤ t. The algorithm described in Figure 6 implements an EA object in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1 + k〉bisource]. As already indicated in Section 5.4, it also assumes that each set F (r)
contains (n− t+ k) processes.
This algorithm is a simple extension of the basic EA algorithm of Figure 3. The lines with the same numbers are the
exactly the same in both algorithms. The lines N1, N2, and N3, are new lines, and the lines 12.M1, 12.M2, 13.M1,
and 13.M2, replace the lines 12 and 13 of Figure 3. Hence, the modifications are restricted to lines N1-N3 and
lines 12.M1-13.M2.
• The first modification (lines N1-N3) is as follows. Before setting the timer of the current round (line 5), the pro-
cesses executes an additional communication phase: each process pi broadcasts the message EA_PROP3[ri ](bagi)
where bagi contains the (n − t) messages EA_PROP2[ri ]() that made true the predicate of line 3. Then, pi waits
until it received a message EA_PROP3[ri ]() from (n− t) processes. This wait is to not set the timer too early, and
(as in Figure 3) makes its expiration dependent only of the message EA_COORD(r)() sent by the round coordinator
at line 13.M1, and the messages EA_RELAY(r)() sent by the processes of F (r) at line 18.
• As now |F (r)| = n− t+k, it is possible that F (r) always contain k Byzantine processes. Consequently, the round
cordinator waits until it obtains the same message EA_PROP2[ri ](w) (contained in a message EA_PROP3[r](),
as defined at line N1) from (k + 1) processes in F (r) (lines 12.M1-12.M2). As at least one of these processes is
correct, it follows that EA_PROP2[r](w) is from a correct process. Hence, when the 〈t+1+k〉bisource coordinates
a round, it selects and broadcasts (line 13.M1) a value w obtained from a correct process.
Remark When we consider the basic algorithm of Figure 3, in addition to a CB-broadcast, an invocation of EA_propose()
involves three sequential communication steps (messages EA_PROP2[r](), EA_COORD[r](), and EA_REALY[r]()). Dif-
ferently, the algorithm of Figure 6 requires an additional communication step (messages EA_PROP3[r]()).
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operation EA_proposek(ri, vali) is % 0 ≤ k ≤ t %
(1) auxi ← CB [ri].CB_broadcast EA_PROP1(vali);
(2) broadcast EA_PROP2[ri](auxi);
(3) wait (EA_PROP2[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t)
different processes, and their aux values belong to CB [ri].cb_validi);
(4) if (the (n− t) previous messages contain the same value v) then return(v) end if;
(N1) let bagi be the bag of the (n− t) previous messages;
(N2) broadcast EA_PROP3[ri](bagi);
(N3) wait (EA_PROP3[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t) diff. processes);
(5) set timeri[ri] to ri;
(6) wait (EA_RELAY[ri](aux) messages received from (n− t) different processes);
(7) if
(
EA_RELAY[ri](v) where v 6= ⊥ received from a process in F (ri)
)
(8) then return(v)
(9) else return(vali)
(10) end if.
when EA_PROP3[r]() is received from a process in F (r) do
(11) if
(
(i = coord(r) ∧ (EA_COORD[r]() not already broadcast)
)
(12.M1) then if
(
∃ w : EA_PROP2[r](w) belong to the bag carried by each message
(12.M2) EA_PROP3[r]() received from (k + 1) processes in F (r)
)
(13.M1) then broadcast EA_COORD[r](w)
(13.M2) end if
(14) end if.
when EA_COORD[r](v) is received from pcoord(r) or (timeri[r] expires) do
(15) if (EA_RELAY[r]() not already broadcast)
(16) disable timeri[r];
(17) if (timeri[r] expired) then v_coordi ← ⊥ else v_coordi ← v end if;
(18) broadcast EA_RELAY[r](v_coordi)
(19) end if.
Figure 6: An algorithm for anm-valued EA object in BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,3〈t + 1 + k〉bisource]
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